INTRODUCTION
No one born in the last eighty years has seen an original work created in her lifetime fall into the public domain.
1 Each time the term of copyright protection has been due to expire, Congress has passed another extension. 2 This has led some scholars to suggest that Congress is effectively granting these works a perpetual copyright, in violation of the Constitution's requirement that such protection only be granted for "limited Times." 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 154: 705 jected this argument as applied to the current framework, 4 the constitutionality of future, more dramatic extensions remains an open question. Moreover, given the singular trajectory of congressional action towards ever-increasing duration, an eventual collision with the outer bounds of "limited Times" seems likely. This Comment argues that, rather than resisting this trend, Congress should instead follow the progression to its natural conclusion and enact a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright.
Such a suggestion is anathema to the many scholars who view the ultimate expiration of copyright as a public entitlement and the repeated copyright extensions by Congress as perpetually depriving the public domain. 5 Yet this conception of the public domain is unduly narrow. Rather than viewing these extensions as Lucy continually pulling the football away just as Charlie Brown is about to kick it, consider instead the similar case of a young child learning to swim. Her father takes a step deeper into the water and says, "Swim to me." Just as she is about to reach him, her father moves farther back and says again, "Swim to me." This process is repeated until the child discovers that she is able to swim on her own, and thus, the tool she thought she needed (the safety of her father's arms) is in fact no longer required.
In a similar fashion, current copyright law gives artists substantial freedom to appropriate from a protected work at the moment of its creation, via doctrines such as fair use 6 and the idea/expression dichotomy. 7 It is, of course, impossible to know how life would have been different if revisions to the law had not allowed copyright owners titioners at 18-32, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (arguing that Congress's attempt to extend copyright protection retroactively violates the Constitution's "limited Times" provision). 4 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94 (holding that Congress did not violate the "limited Times" constraint by enacting a statute that extended the duration of protection for already copyrighted works by twenty years). 5 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 215-16 (" [I] f Congress has the power to extend existing terms [of copyright protection], then the Constitution's requirement that terms be 'limited' will have no practical effect . . . [and] Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly forbids . . . ."); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77-78 (2001) (describing how copyright principles have been reformulated during the past generation in "ways that have expanded copyright's scope and blinded many of us to the dangers that arise from protecting too much, too expansively for too long"). 6 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (describing the fair use exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright holders); see also infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use doctrine). 7 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (establishing the idea/ expression dichotomy); see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the idea/expression dichotomy).
to keep works of the last eighty years from entering the public domain. But the arts 8 have thrived even in the absence of copyright expiration, suggesting that artists have "learned to swim" in a world without what has traditionally been thought of as an expanding public domain.
There is an oft-told tale in the literature of arbitration, describing two brothers involved in a highly contentious dispute over the ownership of an orange. 9 The arbitrator eventually discovers that both siblings can be appeased, as one brother simply wants to squeeze the fruit for its juice, while the other seeks only the peel in order to make marmalade. While the Coase Theorem might have suggested that it would not matter which brother initially received the orange, 10 the parable reflects the reality that irrationality will often lead to market failure, 11 whether the participants are feuding siblings or artists fearful that new technology will destroy their livelihood. 12 This Comment 8 It is important to note that the words 'art' and 'science' have different connotations today than they did when the Framers wrote that Congress would have the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In 1787, the word 'science' "referred to knowledge in general, in all fields of knowledge," whereas "[w]hat we mean today by 'science' was then called natural philosophy. It was quite clearly intended by the authors of the Constitution that copyright, not patents, was intended to promote science, and the province of rights granted to inventors respecting their 'Discoveries' was to promote the 'useful Arts. ' proposes a copyright schema intended to reduce irrationality and maximize social wealth by strengthening the rights most important to traditional content owners, while simultaneously securing the appropriation rights most important to consumers and follow-on artists.
13
The ultimate insight of this Comment is that, by making copyright protection renewable indefinitely but narrowing the scope of protection to cover only those works that would act as market substitutes for the original work, the realignment of rights and privileges would reflect the current trajectory of the law, and moreover would better serve the dual interests of copyright owners and content users. This Comment has four parts. Part I traces the evolution of American copyright law. Part II examines the merits of an indefinitely renewable copyright regime. Part III suggests modifications to traditional copyright doctrines that would complement an indefinitely renewable copyright system. Part IV examines various constitutional impediments to creating an indefinitely renewable term of copyright protection.
I. THE STORY SO FAR: COPYRIGHT LAW, 1790-TODAY
The history of American copyright law has generally been one of expansion. Although one might expect a legislative body traditionally suspicious of monopolies to continually chip away at the monopolistic 14 property rights given to copyright owners, for the most part Congress has tended to broaden the scope and duration of protection afforded to authors of creative works.
This Part traces the chronological development of copyright protection, with special emphasis placed on the evolution of protectable subject matter, infringement by derivative works, and the meaning of "limited Times." This examination is not simply intended to establish "spawned a new industry of videocassette rentals and sales that generated more revenues for Hollywood than the sale of movie tickets").
13 Follow-on artists are artists who incorporate pre-existing works into their own creations. See, e.g., Press Release, Negativland, U2 Negativland: The Case from Our Side (Nov. 10, 1991), reprinted in NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL 2, at 21-25 (1995) (describing Negativland's creative process as follow-on artists).
14 Intellectual property protection does not provide the holder with a right to use the property, but rather with a right to exclude others from using it. Thus, while copyright protection might confer some monopolistic benefits, it is not a monopoly in the traditional sense. For a general discussion of these ideas, see Edmund W. This copyright protection could be renewed for one additional fourteen-year term if the author was still alive at the end of the first term. 16 These initial limitations-restricting what constituted copyrightable subject matter, providing a short duration of protection, and requiring registration-all seem logically grounded in the utilitarian philosophy expressed in the Promote Progress Clause 17 and yet reflect the Framers' general distaste for granting commercial monopolies.
18
In 1831, the subject matter of copyright was expanded to include "musical composition [s] ," and the grant of protection was increased to twenty-eight years (again renewable for an additional fourteen-year term). 19 However, an author's rights remained limited to publication and copying. In addition to these rights in tangible property, courts in the midnineteenth century also began to hold that certain types of copying and borrowing were not violations of an author's exclusive rights. In Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story first articulated the principle (later to become the fair use doctrine) that "a fair and bona fide abridgment of the [copyrighted] work" might not be deemed an impermissible infringement. 32 As the name implies, the fair use doctrine is grounded in the equitable notion that certain forms of appropriation-for example, copying portions of a protected work in order to criticize or parody it-are inherently reasonable. While an author may not like having her creative expression lampooned, a parodic work generally does not act as a market substitute for the original. 33 Some scholars have suggested that the fair use doctrine arose to address the sorts of uses where an author is most likely to be unwilling to license her work of that copy has parted with all his title to it, and has conferred an absolute title to the copy upon a purchaser . . . ."); Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899, 900 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885) (holding that the defendants "had a right to buy, or contract to buy, books from agents who lawfully obtained them by purchase from the plaintiff or his publishers"); Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206-07 ("When [an author] has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed."). 31 Whatever the rationale, the judicially created doctrines of first sale and fair use stand out against the general trend of affording copyright holders increased protection. Moreover, they share a recognition that certain rights ought to vest in persons other than the author of a copyrighted work.
Another notable limitation on authors emerged in the late nineteenth century: the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Selden, held that facts and ideas were uncopyrightable.
36
The Court established the idea/ expression dichotomy, holding that while an author's original expression of an idea is protectable, the underlying idea itself is "the common property of the whole world."
37 Despite a general trend towards increasing the types of works that could be protected by copyright, 38 the Court here announced a clear restriction on copyrightable subject matter. This again reflects the notion that certain aspects of intellectual property become part of the public domain immediately, rather than at the expiration of a copyright's term.
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called on Congress to completely overhaul the copyright system from the ground up, noting that the patchwork development of the scheme through statutory amendments and judicial decisions had produced a confusing and inconsistent system that burdened artists without providing any comparable benefit to the public and that failed to address the many technological advancements that had, by that time, allowed for the 34 36 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (holding that "truths of a science" and "methods of an art" cannot be protected by copyright). 37 Id. at 100. 38 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1884) (holding that photographs are entitled to copyright protection).
production of new types of creative works. 39 Congress responded by passing the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act). 40 With the Act, Congress once again expanded the subject matter of copyrightable works, this time to include "all the writings of an author." 41 The Act also eliminated the requirement that works be registered before receiving protection. Following the passage of the Act, all works affixed with a copyright notice were protected immediately upon publication. 42 Congress also responded to judicial trends in the field, formally codifying the first sale doctrine. 43 And, once again, Congress extended the duration of protection, providing for an initial term of twenty-eight years followed by a renewal term of an additional twentyeight years. 44 Several notable expansions in the area of copyrightable subject matter followed the passage of the 1909 Act. In 1912, Congress brought motion pictures within the ambit of copyright protection; 45 in 1952, protection was extended to for-profit public performances of nondramatic literary works; 46 and although during this time Congress 39 As President Theodore Roosevelt told Congress:
Our Copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the public. Attempts to improve them by amendment have been frequent, no less than twelve acts for the purpose having been passed since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by further amendment seems impractical. A complete revision of them is essential. Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress (Dec. 1905), reprinted in ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 7 (1985) . 40 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amending and consolidating the existing legislation on copyright law) (repealed 1976). 41 Id. § 4. 42 See id. § 10 (stating that compliance with the provisions of the Act would ensure protection). 43 See id. § 41 (providing that a copyright is "distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright"). 44 Id. § 23. 45 See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (amending the copyright statute to include protection for "[m]otion-picture photoplays" and "[m]otion pictures other than photoplays") (repealed 1976). 46 See Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752, 752 (amending the copyright statute to grant copyright holders the right to "present the copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work") (repealed 1976).
declined to conform U.S. copyright law to the 1886 Berne Convention (which sought to harmonize international copyright standards), 47 it did relax the restrictions preventing foreign works from receiving domestic copyright protection. 48 Yet judges again tempered these expansions with further recognition that some content was beyond protection. In 1942, a federal district court held that certain aspects of storytelling were scénes à faire-features so generic that they were uncopyrightable. 49 Modern courts commonly define 'scénes à faire' as "incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic." 50 This doctrine again reflects the notion that the most crucial building blocks for future creative works fall outside the scope of copyright protection.
The most recent overhaul of United States copyright law occurred in 1976, with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act).
51
Congress continued its trend of expanding copyright protection to an ever-broader array of subject matter: "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei- ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
52 And yet this was simultaneously tempered with a codification of the idea/expression dichotomy, cordoning off from copyright protection any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 53 Similarly, Congress formally extended to copyright owners the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work," 54 but again tempered this grant with a codification of the fair use doctrine. 55 Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works did not prevent the public from using any copyrighted material "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." 56 The 1976 Act highlights other trends as well. The duration of copyright protection was again extended, replacing the oncerenewable twenty-eight year term with a single term extending for the life of the author plus fifty years.
57
A sunset provision was added to the manufacturing requirement, 58 and the publication requirement was replaced with the "fixation" requirement (granting protection to any work of authorship "fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
59
The subject matter of copyrights was expanded again in 1980 to include computer software. 60 In 1988, Congress ostensibly brought U.S. copyright law into compliance with the Berne Convention, via The Berne Convention Implementation Act. 61 In 1990, Congress en- 52 Id. § 102(a). 53 Id. § 102(b). 54 Id. § 106(2). 55 See id. § 107 (providing the concept of fair use as a defense to copyright infringement). 56 Id. 57 Id. § 302(a). Works for hire, as well as anonymous and pseudonymous works, were awarded protection for a term of seventy-five years from publication or onehundred years from creation, whichever was shorter. Id. § 302(c). 58 Id. § 601. 59 Id. § 102(a). The point of the preceding analysis is not merely to establish the current state of copyright law; rather, it is to suggest that copyright protection is evolving in a predictable, determinable pattern.
Copyrightable subject matter has grown from a brief list of qualifying art forms in 1790 (maps, charts, and books) to include both contemporary media that were already known at the time of the framing, as well as later-developed media such as photographs, motion pictures, and computer software; and the current broadly worded statute allows protection for any manner of creative expression capable of being fixed in a tangible medium. Although several states have extended copyright protection to unfixed works, 71 federal expansion in this area seems unlikely. 72 However, it seems quite probable that the subject-matter limitation will continue evolving to reflect an everbroader understanding of what may constitute an original work of authorship. 73 The scope of copyright protection awarded to authors has similarly expanded from narrow publication and copying rights to include broad coverage of derivative works. The institutional hurdles required to secure protection have decreased dramatically. 74 And the duration of protection has grown from a renewable fourteen-year term to the life of the author plus seventy years. 75 Although these trends might suggest that the copyright universe is expanding indefinitely, the limiting rules-such as the doctrines of fair use, scénes à faire, and first sale, as well as the idea/expression dichotomy-all suggest a tipping point, after which the public's interest 71 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (expanding copyright protection to include works that are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression).
72 Some scholars have suggested that fixation is not merely "a traditional requirement for federal statutory copyright protection" but is in fact "a constitutional requirement inherent in the Copyright Clause's use of the word 'Writings' to describe the subject matter that Congress can protect pursuant to the Clause." Thomas B. becomes supreme. However, while all of these doctrines serve to limit the outer bounds of exclusive rights awarded to authors, none of them act to resist the continual lengthening of copyright duration, and thus this trend seems likely to continue. Moreover, the recognition that certain aspects of a work should vest in the public domain immediately upon its creation only reinforces the intuition that those rights that do not immediately vest are ones that society can afford to protect with copyright indefinitely.
II. FOREVER AND A DAY: INDEFINITELY RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT
Building on the conclusion in Part I that the duration of copyright protection is likely to continue expanding, this Part examines the merits of advancing this pattern to its ultimate end and adopting a regime that would permit perpetual copyright protection.
Scholars have posited numerous justifications for creating property rights in intellectual goods. A Lockean approach suggests that authors should be rewarded for the fruits of their labor. 76 HegelianPersonhood theory argues that individuals achieve self-actualization through their creative works and thus should have certain 'moral rights' in their works even after creation. 77 Professor Neil Netanel has argued that copyright protection serves a structural function in a democratic society, ensuring the independence of authors and publishers and thereby establishing an important check on the ability of the government to control the content and flow of information. Absent any constitutional limitation, Congress might seek to regulate copyright in order to pursue any one of these philosophical ends. However, among all the powers granted to Congress in Section 8 of Article I, the Intellectual Property Clause is unique in that it provides not just a power (in this case, the ability to grant copyrights and patents) but also a particular philosophical rationale (and thus a possible constraint upon Congress's use of that power): "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
79 As a result, legislation enacted pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause is generally analyzed solely from a consequentialist perspective: does it provide a sufficient incentive for authors to create new works, and does it provide the public with appropriate access to those works? 80 However, these inquiries are often limited by a presupposition that the utilitarian goals expressed in the Promote Progress Clause can only be achieved through a limited term of protection that must inevitably result in all works ultimately passing into the public domain.
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have proposed a countervailing model that would allow copyrighted works to remain protected indefinitely. 81 Although indefinite protection could be realized in numerous forms, their suggested framework would involve the reinstitution of formal requirements for copyright registration and renewal, with no set limit on the number of times an author and her heirs or assignees could renew the copyright in the work. 82 This Part argues that the adoption of an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme would present numerous advantages over the current framework, and moreover is preferable to the current practice of extending the copyright term every time the oldest protected works are about to expire.
Unlike the other changes to copyright law proposed in this Comment, the reintroduction of formal requirements would represent a 79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 80 However, these requirements would serve several important functions and would mitigate or eliminate many of the prime concerns generally raised in opposition to extended or perpetual terms of copyright protection.
First, the reintroduction of registration and renewal would reduce the tracing costs inherent in identifying the owner (or owners) of a copyright in a given work.
84 This is not generally a problem associated with recently published commercial works (as most content owners and distributors include copyright notices even though such affixation is no longer required for copyright protection); 85 however, tracing costs are often cited as a reason not to extend the term of copyright protection, 86 based on the rationale that a longer term increases the possibility that a copyrighted work will be "orphaned."
87
While this may be true in the case of automatic extensions, 88 requiring reasonably frequent renewal (for example, every ten or twenty years) would 83 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that copyright law has evolved in the direction of reducing and eliminating formalities). 84 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78; see also LESSIG, supra note 2, at 288 ("Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of others. . . . [T]hus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak."). 85 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § § 401-406 (2000)) (modifying the copyright scheme to make the affixation of copyright notice permissive rather than required). 86 that an increased term of protection will increase the difficulty in preserving old films due to increased tracing costs).
87 "Orphan works" are generally defined as "copyrighted works where the rights holder is hard to find." Save Orphan Works, http://eldred.cc (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). These works present a problem for follow-on artists who wish to use them, since the search costs associated with identifying copyright owners make the endeavor prohibitively expensive, "even when [the artist would] be willing to pay [a reasonable license fee] to use them. In many cases the works were abandoned because they no longer produced any income. In most cases, rights holders, once found, are delighted to have their work used." Id.
One area where the problem has been particularly pronounced is film preservation, as many early films were produced by studios that are now defunct. actually reduce the tracing costs associated with the current life-plusseventy years term of protection. 89 Similarly, a transition from the current system to one that requires renewal at regular intervals would likely lead to a large number of works actually entering the public domain sooner. 90 While critics of copyright extension often complain that it 'starves' the public domain by prolonging the time before works become free for public use, 91 given the sheer volume of material that potentially qualifies for copyright protection today (from e-mails to doodles to outgoing answering machine messages 92 ), it seems implausible that any more than a small fraction of these works would be renewed even once. 93 This intuition is further supported by empirical data examining works created and published prior to the 1976 Act. Of the works registered for copyright protection between 1883 and 1964, only ten percent were renewed at the end of their initial twenty-eight-year term of protection.
94
Although the cost of renewal may have been a significant deterrent for authors of composite works (such as a large series of individually copyrighted photographs), in the vast majority of cases it appears that the abandonment of copyright protection was due to the "sheer bother of applying for renewal" rather than the renewal fee (which grew from fifty cents in 1909 to the still modest $60 in 2002). 95 And yet, while the bulk of copyrighted works would eventually enter into the public domain, it remains a near certainty that the most popular and valuable works would be renewed so long as they remained commercially viable. 96 Thus, it is important to focus on the effect of allowing this select subset of works to remain in private control indefinitely. For these works, there are the basic concerns that, as they grow more valuable over time, there would be increasing costs to the public, in both the licensing fees that the copyright holder could 89 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78. 90 Id. at 517-18. 91 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 24-25. 92 These all could qualify for copyright protection as "original works . . . fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) . 93 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (arguing, based on empirical data, that even under a regime in which copyrights could be renewed indefinitely, "few would be renewed if even a slight fee were required," and only "the most valuable works would probably be renewed many times"). 94 Id. at 496-500. 95 Id. at 474 & n.10. 96 See id. at 473-74 (discussing data on the number of copyrights that have been renewed).
charge as well as the deadweight loss attributable to individuals being unwilling or unable to pay the increased fees. 97 Yet these problems will persist in the current system as well, so long as Congress continues in its trend of retroactively extending copyright protection.
Moreover, it is important to consider whether there may be a net gain from allowing these works to be renewed indefinitely. Certainly, from a Lockean perspective, such a change would represent an improvement; 98 but might there be a utilitarian gain as well?
The notion that copyright protection ought to have an expiration date is grounded in traditional monopoly concerns, 99 leading many scholars to assume that economic efficiency requires all copyrights to be limited in duration. 100 While this assumption is at odds with traditional economic notions that valuable resources should be owned in order to ensure "efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse,"
101 it is not self-evident that these monopoly concerns apply with equal force to intangible "intellectual" goods.
Indeed, at first blush, intellectual property might seem to be immune to such concerns: the non-rival, non-extinguishable nature of creative expression would seem to suggest that once in the public domain, a work could be exploited by any member of society in whatever way she believed would maximize her own private value, without any negative externalities. 102 97 Id. at 479-81. 98 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the Labor Theory of intellectual property ownership). 99 See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 18, at 922-28 (discussing debates over the ratification of the copyright provision of the Constitution and ensuing concerns about monopolies). 100 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 471 (noting that this is a "widely accepted proposition"); see also Yet content owners have long recognized that over-exposure reduces the total value of a creative work, and indeed, many copyright holders seeking to maximize their profits do so by carefully restricting their exploitation so as not to saturate and ultimately squander the market for their work. 103 Similarly, research in behavioral economics suggests that an over-abundance of choices reduces consumer information, making consumers more likely to choose nothing rather than anything.
104
The point here is not to suggest that there is no value to be had from works in the public domain, but rather that the utilitarian gains from extended copyright protection could easily outweigh the losses. Given the appropriation rights that are immediately available through doctrines such as fair use, the remaining uses of copyrighted works that are withheld from the public are those uses that the public can most easily do without.
Although scholars tend to blanche at the possibility of a world in which Sir Laurence Olivier could not play Hamlet, 105 such hyperbolic fears are almost certainly overstated. For example, it seems likely that in a world with indefinitely renewable copyright protection, the market for copyright assignments would continue to grow, presumably along the lines of what has already developed in the areas of musical compositions and theatrical works, where large publishing houses such as Samuel French specialize in acquiring and licensing protected works. 106 Indeed, organizations generally thought of as resourceOpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998statement.html ("There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property . . . because intellectual property is not destroyed or even diminished by consumption. Once a work is created, its intellectual content is infinitely multipliable."). 103 See, e.g., Bill Britt, Disney's Global Goals, MARKETING, May 17, 1990, at 22 (discussing Disney's efforts to extend the commercial life of its protected properties); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 486-88 (demonstrating that congestion or overuse externalities could decrease the total value of an intellectual property). 104 poor-such as schools and community theaters-are already able to license some protected works because the publishing houses, seeking to capture these smaller markets, employ a licensing structure that allows for price discrimination (based on factors such as theater size and ticket price), making it commercially viable for all involved.
107
But since it is reasonable to assume that there will be market failures, it is important to consider what will be lost in the cases of works that never enter the public domain and cannot be freely licensed. The public is free to take any underlying ideas from those works (due to the idea/expression dichotomy), as well as to copy as much as is necessary for fair use purposes such as criticism and parody. Thus, the public will lose only those appropriations that fail to meet the thresholds of fair use.
This leads to two logical points: first, the standard for fair use should be clearly defined so as to prevent copyright holders from chilling acceptable expression; 108 and second, the definition should be broad enough to cover the class of expressions vital to society that would otherwise be suppressed. While this Comment argues that the contours of fair use should be adapted to better fit a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright, even under the current framework, if something fails to meet the minimum standards to qualify for fair use, it should be something that society can do without.
Scholars tend to reject this latter suggestion out of hand, citing (depending on the level of cultural literacy they wish to intimate) either West Side Story 109 as an adaptation of William Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, 110 or Clueless 111 as an adaptation of Jane Austen's Emma 112 as ccc/do/viewPage?pageCode=au1 (describing the company's role as an "intermediary between copyright owners and content users"). 107 This is not to say that there are not sometimes troubling conflicts within the system. There is certainly a prevalent perception that the "best" copyrighted works remain too expensive for resource-poor organizations to license. And reduced-fee licensees are often forced to accept strict restrictions. For an example from across the pond that could plausibly happen stateside, see Tom Morgan, Why Grease Is Not the Word, DAILY EXPRESS (U.K.), Nov. 30, 2004, at 26 (describing a school production of Grease that was not allowed to advertise for fear of competing with a professional touring version). 108 This first point does not seem controversial, though it seems likely to play an important role in establishing a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (arguing that clarification of the fair use Doctrine would address the primary concern regarding indefinitely renewable copyright). 109 113 the larger point is that, to the extent copyright protection forces artists to be more creative in order to avoid infringement, the public has benefited. This depends in large part on the idea/expression dichotomy; while the actual expression-"Wherefore art thou Romeo?" 114 -is protected, the underlying ideastar-crossed lovers, things end badly-is immediately vested in the public domain and free for appropriation. Thus, if Shakespeare's works were still under copyright protection, follow-on artists would be free to rely on Shakespeare's words and structure as inspiration, yet they would be forced to add enough unique material or otherwise substantially modify any portions they borrowed 115 in order to create a non-infringing work, with the marketplace rewarding the most successful innovations.
However, even assuming that the public can appropriately exploit the most valuable copyrighted works (through fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy), there remains the second half of the question: would an indefinitely renewable copyright regime produce a net benefit over the current system? There is, of course, a natural inclination to be skeptical of a framework that would appear to represent a windfall to the holders of those copyrights with lasting value; does the public receive any comparable benefit from the Walt Disney (Sept. 14, 1995), http://www.jasa.net.au/study/ahinterview.htm. 113 See infra note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that under a narrow definition of derivative work, West Side Story and Clueless would not be considered infringements).
114 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 110, act 2, sc. 2. 115 To the extent that certain dramatic schemata are required in order to tell a story, the scénes à faire doctrine holds that such takings do not constitute infringement. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that representations of the Hindenburg disaster did not constitute infringement, as similarities in portrayal were determined by the subject matter); see also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the scénes à faire doctrine The answer may be yes. Beyond simply fostering a higher threshold of creativity for follow-on artists, indefinitely renewable protection encourages copyright owners to promote, enhance, restore, and otherwise commercially exploit their protected works. For example, the film It's a Wonderful Life 117 fell into the public domain after the expiration of its initial term of protection because "the copyright holder failed to file a timely renewal application."
118 As a result, there was no quality control over the work: television stations severely edited the film to make room for more commercials, and the broadcast picture quality was poor because no one was willing to invest in restoring the prints.
119 Moreover, consumers who purchased home video cassettes of the film often unwittingly received low-quality bootlegs. 120 However, the copyright holders were able to reclaim the film from the public domain by asserting their rights to the underlying short story and music. 121 Subsequently, the copyright holders invested significant capital in producing a high-quality restoration of the film; this was possible because the investment costs could be recouped through the sale of exclusive distribution rights. 122 Thus, in at least some circumstances, the public as a whole would seem to derive certain benefits from the extension of private copyright ownership.
As a corollary to these issues related to indefinitely renewable copyright, Congress would likely be able to generate a significant amount of revenue by switching from the current system to one in which copyright owners must pay a set fee for each renewal of their copyright. Indeed, since there is generally a polarization in the value of protected material over time (with most works tending towards ei- ther extremely high or extremely low value 123 ), Congress would be able to charge substantial fees for subsequent renewals without significantly altering the incentive structure created by an indefinitely renewable copyright regime. 124 What, then, to do with all of this money? Separate from the issues previously discussed, creating an increasingly prominent role for libraries could be an important policy lever in an indefinitely renewable framework. 125 There are, under the current system, already incentives for copyright owners to register their works and deposit copies with the Register of Copyrights and the Library of Congress. 126 But there are no comparable measures currently contained within the legal infrastructure that facilitate the distribution of copyright-protected works to public libraries. By redirecting money from renewal fees into the public library system (and fostering a broader, more efficient inter-library loan system), this new framework could ensure that all 123 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (noting that most copyrights rapidly depreciate in value).
124 While determining the proper amount of the fees is beyond the scope of this Comment, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of administering an indefinitely renewable copyright system could be supported by renewal fees. The rent-seeking behavior of copyright owners whose copyrights were about to expire before the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act suggests that, rather than lobby Congress for another extension every twenty years, they could just as easily spend that money paying renewal fees. See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 483 (discussing rent-seeking behavior). Moreover, given that some intellectual properties are valued at over a billion dollars, it seems plausible that Congress could set ever-increasing renewal fees that ultimately reached into the millions. . Although the statute incentivizes both registration and deposit, in order to remain in compliance with the Berne Convention, neither is a requirement for acquiring copyright protection. See Berne Convention, supra note 47, art. III (setting requirements for contracting states that require registration under their domestic law). copyrighted works are made available to the public for free immediately upon publication and registration. Indeed, while works in the public domain are theoretically possessed by the public at large, there is no guarantee that members of the public will actually have access to them. Just as the underlying idea of a copyrighted work vests with the public immediately, so too should the ability to access the copyrighted work vest immediately as well.
Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable term of copyright protection presents numerous advantages over the current system. While it is not clear whether the benefits of switching to such a scheme would ultimately outweigh the costs if the extant framework were to remain static, it seems likely that the current system will continue evolving in the same direction of ever-increasing terms of protection without any of the comparable benefits that would be derived from registration and renewal. An indefinitely renewable framework is preferable to this practice, in that it would better promote the utilitarian goals of copyright law.
III. GIVE AND TAKE: FAIR USE AND DERIVATIVE WORKS
Although copyright law has grown and evolved in numerous ways that have expanded the rights and benefits available to copyright holders (such as lengthening the term of protection 127 and broadening the scope of protectable subject matter 128 ), the legal precepts that have provided rights and benefits to the public (such as the fair use doctrine) have remained relatively unchanged since their inception. 129 This Part argues that, in conjunction with the transition to a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright, complementary modifications to the scope of traditional copyright protection should also be instituted so as to balance more evenly the needs of copyright holders with those of content users. 127 As previously discussed, 130 the derivative works and fair use doctrines evolved to determine which manner of non-identical copying fell within the exclusive rights afforded to authors and which were immediately permissible by the public. While recognition of derivative works protection addresses the problem of free riders who seek merely to capitalize on the creative output of an artist, 131 the fair use doctrine seeks to carve out an exception for original works that draw in part on protected expressions.
The four factors that Congress instructed courts to consider in determining whether a use should be deemed 'fair' are (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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Congress apparently intended to create a fluid standard that could be adapted to changing times. 133 As a result, numerous courts . 133 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) , reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (noting that "there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change," and further emphasizing that "courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis"). 134 See 1669-86 (1988) (discussing the relative importance of the four factors); Gordon, supra note 34, at 1604 (" [T] he ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its statutory formulation obscure the underlying issues and make consistency and predictabil-guity. The Supreme Court has most notably given guidance by stating that the fourth factor is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."
136 While some scholars have criticized this emphasis on the fourth factor, 137 it can nevertheless be viewed as the magnetic pole of fair use analysis, and one might speculate that, as copyright protection evolves, the significance of the fourth factor will continue to grow to the point that perhaps the other factors become irrelevant. 138 Complementing the argument in Part II that the copyright extension trend should be hastened into an indefinitely renewable copyright regime, this Part argues that such a scheme would best be served by taking the fair use trend towards emphasizing the fourth factor to its ultimate conclusion as well.
A chief concern with an indefinitely renewable framework is that certain types of expressions could be perpetually barred as infringing the copyright of protected works. A fair use test based solely on the fourth factor would ensure that the only expressions being suppressed were those that would act as a substitute for works already present in ity difficult to achieve."); Madison, supra note 32, at 1550-64 (describing the interpretive difficulties posed by the statutory codification of the four factors). 136 the marketplace. 139 In practice, this should result in a broader fair use doctrine, protecting a wider array of works while excluding only those that lack sufficient creativity to target a separate and distinct market.
However, this point highlights one of the problems inherent in a fourth factor analysis: determining the relevant market for the fair use analysis. A German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin might have very little impact on the market for the English version.
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On the other hand, an audio recording of a novel might easily supplant the market demand for the paperback equivalent, yet there might simultaneously be a distinct demand for the audio recording itself.
141 This problem exists due to the broad protection currently given to derivative works. Thus, the proposed modification to the fair use doctrine would best be achieved by simultaneously narrowing the scope of derivative works protection as well.
The simplest solution would be to stop extending copyright protection to derivative works entirely. Naomi Voegtli has suggested that such rights are not necessary for an author to profit from ancillary markets for her work.
142 She argues that lead time (and thus the opportunity to create derivative works prior to publication), as well the ability to profit from goodwill associated with claims of authenticity (which non-authors would be barred from doing under laws of unfair competition), may provide sufficient compensation. 143 However, this places a heavier burden on the author while primarily benefiting free riders, an odd direction in which to move the law. 144 Ms. Voegtli of- 139 Moreover, these works would ideally be available via public libraries. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that copyright renewal fees be used to support the public library system). 140 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing a court opinion rejecting an infringement claim based on a German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin).
141 For example, it seems likely that Michael Imperioli, a star of HBO's mafiathemed drama The Sopranos, was enlisted to record the audio version of Mario Puzo's mafia-themed novel Omerta at least partly in order to capitalize on a segment of the market that would not otherwise purchase the book. 143 Id. at 1242. 144 While the benefit to free riders could conceivably trickle down to the public, as the commercialization of market substitutes would be likely to drive down prices and reduce deadweight loss, that benefit would be offset by the decreased incentive to create new works, and moreover, a comparable benefit (without the corresponding loss) could be achieved by making the actual works available for free through public libraries. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the role that public libraries could play in an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme).
Moreover, so long as courts are vigilant in protecting the original work from market substitutes, this narrower conception of derivative works should not significantly diminish the incentive structure of copyright protection, even though it simultaneously provides the public with a wider array of creative expressions.
Finally, an ancillary concern with indefinitely renewable copyright protection is that it would heighten current problems that exist due to the ambiguity surrounding the contours of fair use. Professor Polk Wagner has convincingly argued that both copyright owners and appropriators are made worse off by the uncertainty of the doctrine.
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In addition, as new technologies develop and new uses for creative works arise, these uncertainties are magnified, and all parties experience a loss in perceived rights. 152 However, this problem too could be solved by shifting to a fair use test that relies solely on the fourth factor; such a test would increase clarity and certainty, and thus the value of the works to all parties. 153 Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable copyright regime should be paired with a modified conception of the proper scope of copyright protection. An emphasis on the fourth fair use factor would strengthen the economic incentive to create new works by providing stronger financial protection for those works, while simultaneously expanding the public domain by permitting any and all creative appropriations of those works that do not act as market substitutes. By pairing duration extension with a new derivative works/fair use paradigm, both copyright owners and follow-on artists would be able to extract valuable elements from the intellectual property without depriving the other of significant benefits. Times' constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions," 155 but explicitly declined to address what might constitute the "outer boundary of 'limited Times.'" 156 This Part speculates on the greatest extent of protection that might be permissible under the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as the possibility of circumventing its limitations through the Commerce Clause.
IV. CAN'T BUY ME LOVE
There is some historical evidence to suggest that the Limited Times Clause was not meant to be a restraint on Congress's power at all. By some accounts, the Clause was actually included simply to ensure that anyone interpreting the Constitution (especially those aware of the Framers' general aversion to monopolies) would understand that the power to grant patent and copyright monopolies was meant to be included within the subset of acts within Congress's power under the Intellectual Property Clause. 157 Nevertheless, such a reading seems unlikely to carry the day, as it is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court's recent classification of the Clause as a constraint on Congress. 158 Thus, the question should not be whether the Clause restrains Congress's power, but rather, how?
In its most literal sense, the "limited Times" restriction would be honored so long as copyright protection were granted for fixed terms of years. 159 Indeed, the original draft of the Intellectual Property Clause allowed Congress to grant protection for "a limited time"; 160 by amending the clause to instead read "limited Times," the Framers presumably intended to allow Congress to grant renewal terms. 161 scheme from 1790 to 1976. Thus, even a system of indefinitely renewable copyright might be permissible under the Intellectual Property Clause. 162 Nevertheless, this reading runs up against the problem that the Framers seem to have clearly imagined that works protected by this Clause would eventually fall into the public domain. 163 What, then, of extending copyright protection through another grant of power, such as the Commerce Clause? 164 The Supreme Court has generally been skeptical of congressional attempts to do with one power that which it has been explicitly barred from doing with another. 165 Thus, the Court has read limitations into the Commerce Clause from the Bankruptcy Clause, 166 the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 167 the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, 168 and 162 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 472 (postulating that the constitutional notions of state sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment. 169 Justice O'Connor has also suggested that limitations may be found in the Twenty-first Amendment. 170 On the other hand, the Court has also noted that certain enumerated powers may simply overlap, and in those situations, restrictions on the exercise of one power do not constrain Congress's ability to act pursuant to another. 171 For instance, the Court found that Congress could circumvent the limitations of the Tax Clause-that all taxes be "for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"
172 -by enacting tax legislation through the Commerce Clause. 173 This view, that the General Welfare Clause did not limit the Commerce Clause, is especially significant given the close parallel between the General Welfare Clause and the Promote Progress Clause. 174 In both cases, the Constitution grants Congress the power to achieve an abstract goal and delineates a particular method by which that ultimate goal might be achieved. Thus, just as the Su-preme Court has found that taxes enacted outside the scope of the General Welfare Clause may nevertheless be permissible under the Commerce Clause, the door might similarly be open for copyright protection beyond the Intellectual Property Clause to be properly justified under the Commerce Clause.
Professor Thomas Nachbar has argued for the general proposition that the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses should be viewed as overlapping grants of power and that the explicit constraints in the Intellectual Property Clause should not be viewed as "affirmative" limitations on other enumerated powers. 175 However, he nevertheless concedes that "there is a stronger textual argument for applying the 'limited Times' restriction to the whole of Section 8 than there is for any of the Intellectual Property Clause's other limits." 176 Other scholars have similarly concluded that the Commerce Clause may not be used to circumvent the "limited Times" provision. 177 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the anti-bootlegging statute, 179 and courts have been similarly generous in their appraisal of Congress's ability to provide copyright-like protection via the Commerce Clause, most notably with the DMCA. 180 Despite substantial skepticism, 181 courts have consistently upheld the statute in the face of constitutional challenges arguing that its protection violates the Article I, Section 8 "limited Times" constraint. 182 Moreover, courts have recognized in other contexts that the Intellectual Property Clause does not act as a restraint on Congress's other powers. For example, in Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the Intellectual Property Clause, by empowering Congress to promote progress through the grant of patents and copyrights, did not prevent Congress from promoting progress through other means, such as government sponsorship of research and development. 183 Finally, there is a fundamental structural constraint on the term "limited Times." Congress is not simply empowered to grant copyrights, but rather "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," 184 with the ability to secure copyrights "for limited Times" 185 provided as a means to that end. 186 Thus, if Congress were explicitly acting to pursue a different philosophical end, such as protecting the 'moral rights' of artists, 187 then the "limited Times" constraint would not necessarily be applicable. 188 Promulgating an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme under the Commerce Clause would philosophically harmonize the system with the modified conception of copyright protection proposed in Part III, which measures the metes and bounds of that protection solely by analyzing the market substitution effects of potentially infringing works. Moreover, a Commerce Clause scheme would be more or less limited to governing only those works sold through channels of interstate commerce, 189 which would be a minuscule fraction of the works that currently receive federal protection through statutes promulgated pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause. Thus, a Commerce Clause copyright system could act concurrently with the current Intellectual Property Clause copyright framework, with qualifying works eligible for protection under either statutory scheme.
At its heart, indefinitely renewable copyright hinges on the finding that extending the duration of protection would promote the consequentialist goals of copyright law. The ultimate purpose of the Limited Times Clause is, after all, to provide Congress with the power to satisfy the utilitarian Promote Progress Clause. 190 Thus, whether an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme were to be promulgated under either the Intellectual Property Clause or the Commerce Clause, there would be a strong structural argument against binding Congress to a narrow interpretation of "limited Times" that undermined its ability to simultaneously benefit both copyright owners and content users. If one were to accept that these two clauses were in conflict, it seems reasonable to conclude that the "limited Times" constraint should be interpreted in a manner subservient to the Promote Progress Clause.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law is evolving along several clear axes. Based on its current trajectories, the duration of protection will continue to grow while the fourth factor will increasingly dominate fair use analysis. These trends should be carried out to their ultimate bounds, in a scheme that permits copyrights to be renewed an unlimited number of times, but provides protection only against works that would act as market substitutes for the original. Such a framework presents numerous advantages over the current system, especially if Congress continues its practice of granting retroactive copyright extensions each time the extant term is about to expire. Ultimately, the proposed schema seeks to maximize social wealth by reconceptualizing and reallocating the rights associated with copyright protection, providing both copyright owners and content users with increased protection for the rights that they value most.
